Mired In Mogadishu

Executive Summary

Since 2016, successive UK governments have spoken of an outward-looking, collaborative and influential post-Brexit Britain. A series of speeches and policy statements emphasised the need to pursue future prosperity through overseas engagements, building on investments in diplomacy, trade, defence and development aid. In March 2021, the UK government published its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, reiterating similar themes and referencing Eastern Africa as a theatre where the UK should increase its focus.

Against this backdrop, a RUSI research team examined how the UK has deployed its development, defence and diplomacy toolkit across the region since 2015. The project, entitled “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa”, identified factors helping or hindering the UK in its pursuit of a “Global Britain” agenda across four countries in the region: Kenya; Ethiopia; Somalia; and Sudan. It tested common assertions about the effects of Brexit, reductions in the UK aid budget, and the merger of two government departments – the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) – alongside any wider enablers and constraints.

This paper sets out findings on the UK’s intervention within one of these countries, Somalia, from 2015 to 2022. Beneath an (erstwhile) “Global Britain” rebrand, the aims and scope of UK activities appeared largely unchanged, with an emphasis on mitigating successive humanitarian crises and containing the regional threat of Al-Shabaab. Sharing links to conflict, violence and poor governance, these objectives have been integrated into a broader state-building approach to help improve Somali self-sufficiency, military capabilities and, by extension, stability.

From the low baseline of 2012, when the Federal Government of Somalia was first established, progress has clearly been achieved. Alongside other external partners, the UK supported the development of a new political framework, a national security architecture and the trappings of a modern administrative system. It has co-chaired key international conferences, championed the federal agenda and contributed to the formation and function of Federal Member States. The flexibility of UK programming, relationships at the subnational level, convening power and widely recognised expertise, especially in the humanitarian sector, have also allowed stakeholders to carve strategic niches in an otherwise congested donor landscape.

Similarly, the longevity and breadth of its coverage and permanent in-country presence afford the UK credibility and influence, and position its embassy as an information hub for international and local parties. Among other examples, this has fed into progress on debt relief and improvements in public financial management, acted as a catalyst for stabilisation processes, and proved critical in mobilising outside engagement during the 2017 drought.

Recent shifts within the UK have, of course, had an impact. Leaving the EU caused disruption, as did the creation of a new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), although the benefits of greater synchronicity of diplomacy and development is evident given the politicised realities of operating across the Horn. A larger problem was the reduction of Whitehall’s aid budget, which damaged the scope and reliability of interventions and the confidence of partners and local recipients. Perhaps most obvious is in humanitarian delivery, where inadequate levels of UK funding detracted from an already-lacklustre response, various workstreams faced cuts to activities and lags in follow-on programming occurred. Exacerbated by a preoccupation with the 2021/22 presidential election campaign, this confusion interrupted forward planning, sapped momentum for long-term structural reform and diminished the UK’s ability to translate influence into tangible change, whether multilaterally or at the national level. Should the fall in aid spending continue – as it is forecast to do – this trend will likely persist, making it difficult to rapidly upscale engagement later down the line as the UK’s networks, access and reserves of goodwill steadily diminish.

However, it is important to recognise that the main impediments to UK strategic goals predate these changes. Aside from the contextual difficulties of operating in Somalia, such issues are tied to disparities between donor expectations and capabilities, which stem from broader questions over the feasibility of Western state-building. Technical fixes and capacity-building have a limited shelf-life if there is little Somali agreement over fundamental issues of governance and authority. As illustrated by the UK’s stabilisation efforts, successes can be achieved at the local level, but sustainability and scalability depend on whether they can plug into legitimate, sufficiently resourced domestic infrastructure. Incremental advances have been made, but they are neither sufficient nor commensurate with the timelines imposed by weary donors. At the same time, external contributions are often enmeshed (deliberately or incidentally) in a political economy that incentivises and reproduces instability. As a result, the “Global Britain” agenda remains subject to the same critiques of international state-building that have framed UK policymaking in Somalia for the past decade.

Introduction

Following the June 2016 Brexit vote, then UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson repeatedly referred to the concept of “Global Britain”. While the phrase attracted widespread commentary, much of it quizzical or critical, it was an attempt to frame the UK as a proactive, outward-facing country.

In March 2021, the UK government published the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. Within an increasingly competitive international environment, the document reiterated familiar “Global Britain” themes, heralding a proactive role in global affairs; work in partnership with others; and better integration of foreign policy, defence, trade and international development efforts. In Africa, the UK would forge relationships and pursue shared goals such as prosperity, democracy and security, and in Somalia specifically, focus on conflict resolution, stabilisation and support for the African Union Mission (AMISOM) and its successor, the African Transition Mission (ATMIS).

Two years later, the Integrated Review Refresh provided an update of the government’s policy priorities amid a fast-changing global context. Although no longer using the language of “Global Britain”, the key themes remained consistent, with Africa flagged as an arena for deepening relationships and engagement, and greater emphasis placed on leveraging international development alongside “the full range of UK strengths and expertise”.

Against this backdrop, the RUSI project “Furthering Global Britain? Reviewing the Foreign Policy Effect of UK Engagement in East Africa” examined how the UK has used development, defence and diplomacy to pursue the “Global Britain” agenda in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. It explores how far UK engagement contributed towards positive change in recipient countries, and whether this helped advance the national interest at a time of domestic and international change. The project considers whether structural shifts – including a reduced UK aid budget, Brexit and the creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) – have proved a help or a hindrance, and identifies wider factors enabling or constraining UK influence and impact.

The research methodology entailed a review of selected academic and policy literature and, in the case of this paper, 61 semi-structured expert interviews conducted between November 2021 and December 2022, featuring a range of current and former government officials, staff from multilateral organisations, academics, and civil society and business figures (see Table 1). The intention was to provide an overview of UK engagement in each country over the six-year period and to diagnose factors salient in driving significant outcomes, with particular reference to “positive” areas where British agency was considered to be important. While references to interviews have been omitted to maintain anonymity, quotations from interviews are used in this paper to demonstrate the complexities of the UK–Somalia bilateral relations and politics without referring to any individual person.

▲ Table 1: Interview Breakdown. Source: Author generated.

This paper is composed of three chapters. Chapter I provides background on UK–Somalia relations and summarises the UK’s major policy interests and main development, humanitarian, diplomatic and defence investments in recent years. Within this broad portfolio of work, Chapter II highlights examples of UK contributions to positive outcome areas, before identifying key factors that have constrained or enabled UK action, which are unpacked further in Chapter III. Due to limited space, the paper focuses exclusively on the Federal Republic of Somalia, rather than Somaliland.

The analysis forms part of a series of publications, including a capping paper that lays out the project methodology and greater detail on UK investments across the region, four country case studies focusing on the UK’s work in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya and a further publication that synthesises the overall findings and recommendations of this project.

Michael Jones is a Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team examining political violence, governance by non/pseudo-state armed groups, and the convergence of violent extremism and insurgent militancy in East and sub-Saharan Africa. He has led investigative fieldwork across various countries including Sudan, Kenya and Lebanon; managed conflict focused projects looking into Darfur and Somalia; and worked in RUSI’s Nairobi Office on a range of projects related to the EU’s STRIVE Horn of Africa and STRIVE II programming.